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I. INTRODUCTION
Employer-employee relations in the United States from the commencement
of the industrial revolution up to the present have been governed by the "em-
ployment-at-will" doctrine. The "at-will" rule is defined as "a contract employ-
ing a person without any agreement as to the period of service [in terms of
duration] will be deemed a hiring at will, subject to be terminated at the pleas-
ure of either of the parties."" Under the at-will rule, the employer has the right
to discharge a worker in his employ at any time and for any reason.2 It is
equally true that the employee may terminate his employment at any time with-
out reason, regardless of any potential harm to his employer.3
Although the national statutory and judicial trend in recent times has been
to create exceptions to the traditional at-will rule,4 the Ohio Supreme Court has
shown an entrenched reluctance at best, or an obstinate refusal at worst, to
deviate from strict adherence to the rule.5 Thus, the court up until 1989 had
gone only so far as to establish a narrow exception to the rule founded on the
contract principle of promissory estoppel. In such a case a discharged employee
may allege that an employer's representations or promises of employment were
relied on to the employee's detriment, and that the employer should be estopped
from using the defense of the at-will rule in discharging the employee.'
However, in the recent case of Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing,
Inc., 7 the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged in a footnote that statutes newly
adopted" by the Ohio legislature had in effect modified the common law, creat-
ing a public policy exception to the at-will rule.9 Despite the court's recognition
of the legislature's expressed desire to protect employees who report their em-
ployers' violations of the law (known popularly as a "whistleblower" statute),
the court refused to directly address the possible application of the new statute
to the facts in Helmick. The court instead conformed the facts of the case to its
previously established promissory estoppel exception to the at-will rule set forth
in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co."0
However, courts that adhere to a strict construction of the law can find
themselves in a self-induced bind. Typical of such courts, the Ohio Supreme
Court has espoused the view that they should not go beyond the statutory poli-
cies of the state legislature. They would not, therefore, judicially manufacture a
I. 39 0. JUR. 3d Employment Relations § 28, at 59 (1982).
2. D. MACKEY. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY (1986).
3. 0. JUR, 3d, supra note I, § 28, at 59-60.
4. Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Employee May Discharge At- Will Employer For Any Reason,
12 A L R.4th 550 (1982).
5. Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
6. Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
7. 45 Ohio St. 3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212 (1989).
8. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4113.51 through 4113.53 (Baldwin 1989).
9. 45 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 543 N.E.2d at 1217 (1989).
10. Helmick, 45 Ohio St. 3d at 135-37, 543 N.E.2d at 1216-17.
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public policy exception to the time-honored employment-at-will rule if the Ohio
legislature did not first enact a statute granting them specific authority. When
the legislature enacted a whistleblower statute"1 in 1988, the court had no
choice but to disclaim recent past decisions upholding employment-at-will or-
thodoxy. In Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 2 the fac-
tual dicta of Helmick became established precedent: public policy exceptions to
the at-will rule would now be permitted in Ohio when specific statutory lan-
guage so indicated.2
3
This Note will examine the current position of the Ohio Supreme Court
regarding the adoption of a public policy exception to the at-will rule and will
explore reasons why the court should use the newly enacted statute as a man-
date to adopt a broad public policy exception to the rule. Part II of this Note
will briefly provide a history of the employment-at-will rule. Part III will survey
the legal trends among the various states, noting the extremes between those
jurisdictions taking an absolutist view of the at-will rule and those jurisdictions
permitting the most deviation from the rule in the form of public policy excep-
tions. Other theories advanced to establish exceptions of the at-will rule will be
examined as well. Part IV will discuss the history and current status of the rule
in Ohio giving particular attention to the effects of the passage of the Ohio
whistleblower statute and the Ohio Supreme Court's stance in Helmick and
Greeley. Part V will analyze the economic and policy considerations for ex-
panding a public policy exception to the at-will rule, concluding that a broad
exception founded on public policy should be adopted by the Ohio Supreme
Court.
II. HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE
As one commentator has said, "[Ilt is no mistake that . . .U.S. legal di-
gests place this topic [of employment-at-will] under the ancient heading
'Master and Servant.' It is precisely that relationship that still colors the think-
ing of most Americans."' 4 The very category "Master and Servant" suggests a
relationship harkening back to the "employment" arrangement between the feu-
dal lord and serf in Europe's Middle Ages, when the employee-serf was tied to
the land and had no rights other than those which the lord of the manor dic-
tated. As European law changed in response to the new realities of the indus-
trial revolution, the residual thinking left over from its feudal ancestry had its
impact in making the preservation of property rights a predominant goal of the
law.' 5
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a general theory of contract, in
which the rights to property were enforced in the burgeoning employer-em-
ployee relationships of the industrial revolution, came to dominate the Ameri-
I1. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (Baldwin 1989).
12. 49 Ohio St. 3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990).
13. Id. at 234, 551 N.E.2d at 990.
14. D. MACKEY, supra note 2, at 9.
15. See generally Hill, Arbitration as a Means of Protecting Employees from Unjust Dismissal: A Statutory
Proposal, 3 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 11I (1982).
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can common law. Contract theory of the time emphasized the freedom of the
parties to bargain and exchange promises."6 The "freedom of contract" evolved
naturally from the prevailing laissez-faire economic philosophy of the day. Lais-
sez-faire as a political-economic philosophy envisioned a government that would
permit the marketplace to operate free of restrictions or interventions.,, The
general acceptance of freedom of contract in the American common law was
reinforced by the credo popular among nineteenth-century Americans that as-
serted the importance of the individual's self-sufficiency in securing his eco-
nomic livelihood. The latter half of the nineteenth century was also a period
known for the unimpeded development of capitalism in America, carrying with
it a certain reverence for the opinions put forth by the captains of industry. One
such axiom was that what was good for private enterprise was good for all,
leaving employers a free hand in establishing wages and working conditions for
their employees.' 8
A natural offshoot of the freedom of contract doctrine was a rule under
which an employment contract (or the employment relationship without benefit
of expressed contractual terms) with no expressed period of duration created a
presumption that the employee was terminable from his employment at the will
of either party.'9 Courts have generally declined to interfere with freedom of
contract if the employee failed to obtain express contractual protections against
termination.20 Under the contract theory of consideration, courts have held that
an employee's work by itself, without additional consideration, entitled him to a
wage only and, therefore, could not support a promise of job security.1 In addi-
tion, since the employee made no mutually exchanged promise to work for a
particular employer for a fixed period of time, he could not imply a promise by
the employer to retain his services."
The actual adoption by American courts of the employment-at-will rule
resulted from an error made by an influential legal scholar, H.G. Wood, the
author of an 1877 encyclopedia of law.23 Although the English common law had
been that a hiring of an employee for no fixed period of time resulted in an
implied duration of one year, Wood misinterpreted the English precedents to
declare that the contract could be terminated at will by either party at any time
in the absence of a fixed term of duration.2' The American courts thereafter
adopted the "Wood" doctrine in its orthodox form. "An analysis of early
[American] case law involving the application of Wood's rule indicates judicial
acceptance of the rule with little or no independent legal analysis."'25 Most early
16. D. MACKEY, supra note 2, at 10.
17. BLACK'S LAw DiCTIONARY 876 (6th ed. 1990).
18, Hill, supra note 15, at 119.
19. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1825 (1980).
20. ld. at 1818-19.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1819.
23. D. MACKEY. supra note 2, at 10-11.
24. Id. at If.
25. Hill, supra note 15, at 118 n.42.
19911
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
courts generally found no agreement as to duration of employment and upheld
dismissal of the plaintiff-employee's action .2
The Supreme Court elevated the at-will doctrine to a constitutional right in
Lochner v. New York, holding that the courts could not interfere with the free-
dom of the master and servant to contract with each other.27 The at-will rule
reached its zenith of influence in Coppage v. Kansas:28
[S]ince it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common, some persons must
have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold
freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recog-
nizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the
exercise of those rights.28
The Court upheld a requirement by employers that employees execute a "yellow
dog"80 contract promising to resign from or refuse to join a union while em-
ployed. The Court, thus, recognized a constitutional right to hire and fire at
will.31 It was not until NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.32 that the Court
upheld a federal statute (the Wagner Act) prohibiting employers from dis-
charging employees for union membership, and, thus, abrogating the Court's
strict adherence to the at-will rule.
The Great Depression had a significant impact on the courts' and legisla-
tures' views regarding the traditional at-will rule. Commencing with the New
Deal, federal legislation signaled willingness on the part of lawmakers to miti-
gate the perceived harsh effects of the at-will rule. State legislation quickly fol-
lowed.33 It was also natural for the courts to reflect the changes in social and
economic philosophy. Since the New Deal era, there was greater social accept-
ance of Keynesian economic theory which engendered permissible government
control of certain economic mechanisms to achieve public policy goals. In an era
when caveat emptor had been mitigated or eliminated under the common law
by new doctrines of product liability, the courts would not be hesitant to temper
the at-will rule with exceptions that would erect certain protections for the
worker.
The at-will doctrine has been labeled the "American rule."3' The Ameri-
can legal system is one of the few where the doctrine has remained generally in
force despite the exceptions that have been established during the last fifty
years. Among industrialized countries, American law is unique in its retention
of the at-will rule. For example, Great Britain has repudiated the at-will doc-
trine. Under the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, employees are guaranteed
26. Id.
27. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
28. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
29. Id. at 17.
30. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1449 (5th ed. 1979).
31. Coppage, 236 U.S. 1.)
32. 301 U.S. I (1937).
33. Comment, The Case for Keeping Employment-At- Will: An Analysis of Ohio's Position and the Use of
Disclaimers to Avoid Wrongful Discharge Litigation, 16 CAP. U. L. Rav. 723, 725-26 (1987).
34. D. MACKEY, supra note 2. at 10.
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the "right not to be unfairly dismissed. '35 The employer is required to demon-
strate that an employee's disputed discharge was founded on the employee's
incapability to do the work or the lack of qualification to perform the desig-
nated work.36 Similarly, Germany has statutorily granted employees protection
against unjust dismissal, 37 and their courts have upheld dismissals only if the
discharge is related to the job.38
III. THEORIES FOR PERMITTING EXCEPTIONS TO THE AT-WILL RULE
GENERALLY
Two distinct theories of action have been developed by American courts to
create exceptions to the at-will rule. The first is an outgrowth of contract law, a
logical evolution when one considers that the at-will doctrine had its roots in
freedom of contract. Therefore, some of the initial steps of reform were based
on traditional contract defenses such as promissory estoppel. Under the estoppel
theory, courts have held that detrimental reliance by the employee on the prom-
ise or inducements of an employer can serve as support for the supposition that
employment was contractually intended to continue for a reasonable period of
time,39 or as separate consideration to support a promise of job security.40 Typi-
cal of these cases has been the Ohio approach as seen in Mers v. Dispatch
Printing Co.,41 to be discussed below. Other jurisdictions have allowed recovery
in contract, requiring an employer to terminate employment in good faith.42
The second and most influential theory of action for establishing an excep-
tion to the at-will rule is found in tort principles. Tort-based actions have
presented the greatest inroads into the orthodox application of the at-will rule.
A major concern of the proponents of the at-will rule is the fear of punitive
damages that may accompany any litigation based on tort.43
Some courts and certain state statutes have incorporated a cause of action
in tort founded on a violation of public policy. Courts have recognized several
broad areas for the application of a public policy tort action: (1) where the
employee is terminated for asserting a statutory right; (2) where the employee
is discharged for refusing to commit or acquiesce in criminal activity; (3) where
an employee is discharged for complying with a statutory duty; and (4) where
the employee is fired for reporting violations of law.44 The focus in these cases
35. Hill, supra note 15, at 156 (citing The Industrial Relations Act 1971, Ch. 72 § 22-23, 41 HAL. STAT.
2062 (1971 Cont. Vol.)).
36. Id. at 156.
37. Hill, supra note 15, at 157 n.217 (citing Law of August 10, 1951, An Act to Provide Protection Against
Unwarranted Dismissals, 1951 Bundesgesetzblatt 1 499 (W. Ger.) translated in I.L.O. Legislative Series 1951,
Ger. F.R. 4).
38. Hill, supra note 15, at 158.
39. Note, supra note 19, at 1820.
40. Id.
41. 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
42. See Comment, supra note 33, at 729-30.
43. Id. at 729.
44. Note, The Employntent-At- Will Doctrine, Time to Collapse Another Citadel, I I U. DAYTON L. REV.
399. 402 (1986).
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may properly be said to be on the wrong to the public interest rather than on
the wrong to the individual.4 5
Out of these broad categories of exceptions to the at-will rule based on
violations of public policy by the employer, distinct categories of policy viola-
tions may be identified .4 The first category involves those cases where an em-
ployee has been discharged for refusing to commit a crime. The lead case is
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396.'4 In
Petermann, the plaintiff alleged that he had been ordered by his employer to
commit perjury before a legislative committee. The court held that the dis-
charge, which occurred after the employee testified truthfully, had as its goal
the coercing of an act proscribed by a criminal statute and would give rise to a
cause of action.48
A second category of cases concerns the discharge of an employee for per-
formance by the employee of an important public obligation or upholding the
law. In Nees v. Hocks,'49 the plaintiff was discharged for making herself availa-
ble for jury duty after her employer had ordered her to excuse herself from such
duty. Although no specific state statute applied directly to the violation alleged,
the court implied a violation by the defendant-employer from statutes encourag-
ing citizens of the state to serve on juries.50
Closely related are cases typified by Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co.51 There, the plaintiff-employee was discharged for furnishing incriminating
evidence to the police of another employee's criminal activity. The court found
that the employer had engaged in a retaliatory discharge; this violated a public
policy encouraging citizens to report crimes.52
Of a more private nature are those cases concerning a discharge for exer-
cising a statutory right. In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,53 an employee
was fired for filing a worker's compensation claim. Although the statute pertain-
ing to such claims did not bar the employer from firing the employee, the court
recognized a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.54
In the category of cases that are brought because the plaintiff-employee
has been discharged due to discrimination based on the employee's sex, age,
race, alienage, religious beliefs, or handicap, the courts may disallow the action
if an alternative remedy is available. In Wehr v. Burroughs Corp.,55 the plaintiff
alleged that dismissal based on age violated a public policy as embodied in the
state statute prohibiting age discrimination. The court held that an action
founded on a public policy violation required that (1) the discharge violate a
45. Id. at 410.
46. See Kauff & Weintraub, Recent Developments in the Law of Unjust Dismissal, 1982-83, (printed in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, UNJUST DISMISSAL 1983, 15.
47. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
48. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
49. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
50. Id. at 219, 536 P.2d at 516.
51. 85 lll.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
52. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
53. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
54. Id. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
55. 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977), a ffd on other grounds, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980).
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well-established public policy and (2) there be no other remedy to protect the
interests of the individual or society. Since a state statute provided an alterna-
tive administrative remedy, the court determined that the plaintiff's proposed
remedy was inappropriate.56
A distinct set of cases involves the discharge of employees for disclosing
alleged violations of law, the so-called whistleblower cases. In Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 7 the plaintiff claimed he was discharged in retaliation for
efforts to insure that his company's labeling and licensing of products complied
with official regulations in his role as quality control director for the company.
He was fired after informing his employer of the use of substandard raw materi-
als and underweight components. The court held that an employee should not
be forced to choose between the risk of criminal sanctions and continued
employment.58
In terms of those jurisdictions invoking the broadest public policy excep-
tions to the at-will rule, the California courts have assumed their familiar status
as groundbreakers. In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,5" an at-will employee
was fired for refusing to participate in an illegal price fixing scheme. The court
held that the employee retained certain implied rights of protection against un-
lawful discharge under statutory and constitutional provisions. Therefore, as
there were state code provisions prohibiting price fixing and collusion in crimi-
nal activity, the court stated that an employer discharging an employee who
refused to acquiesce in the illegal act was liable for wrongful discharge. 60 Since
the cause of action in cases such as Tameny derive from a necessarily unex-
pressed standard, i.e., no statute specifically imposes liability for wrongful dis-
charge, opponents of such a broad approach might complain of inadequate no-
tice to the employer as to what actions would confer liability and of the ad hoc
nature of the adjudication of such laws. 6' Some opponents of the wrongful dis-
charge exception based on implied public policy have expressed a fatalistic con-
cern for the survival of the at-will rule. "The doctrine could now face complete
collapse at the hands of private causes of action for wrongful discharge."62
To counter the inexactitudes of the Tameny approach, the New Hampshire
court in Cloutier v. A&P Tea Co.,63 developed a two-part test. First, the em-
ployee must show that the employer's action in discharging the employee was
motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation. 4 In addition, the employee "must
demonstrate that he was discharged because he performed an act that public
policy would encourage, or refused to do something that public policy would
condemn. 65
56. Id. at 1055.
57. 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
58. Id. at 480, 427 A.2d at 389.
59. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
60. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
61. See Comment, Employment At Will in Ohio: Working From Within, 20 AKRON L. REv. 471, 475
(1987).
62. Comment, supra note 33, at 726.
63. 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
64. Id. at 921, 436 A.2d at 1143.
65. Id. at 921-22, 436 A.2d at 1143-44.
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Finally, there are those jurisdictions that steadfastly refuse to recognize
any public policy exception to the at-will rule, such as the Alabama court in
Reich v. Holiday Inn.6" This court, like the Ohio courts until recently, mechani-
cally upheld the at-will rule against the challenge posed by an employer-defend-
ant's violation of public policy on the basis of established precedent and the
failure of the state legislature to enact a public policy exception. 67
IV. THE STATUS OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE IN OHIO
A. Recent Cases Upholding the At-Will Doctrine
The Ohio Supreme Court has recently purported to uphold the traditional
employment-at-will rule in two cases. In Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co.,66 the
court considered an allegation by the plaintiff that the employer discharged her
without just cause and in contravention of a statutory policy prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of age.69 First, the court reviewed the issue of whether
the policy codified in Ohio Revised Code Section 4101.17 requires Ohio courts
to allow a private civil right of action for damages. 70 Section 4101.17 prohibited
employers from discharging "without just cause" any employee between the
ages of forty and sixty-five who were physically competent to perform the work
and otherwise met the standards of the industry.71 The court observed that the
statute did not include a remedy for its breach.72 Because the General Assembly
did not intend by clear implication to create a civil action for damages for
breach of the statute, and because the General Assembly invested the Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations with authority to enforce the statute, the court
declined to establish a private cause of action.73
The court then took up a second contention of the plaintiff:
[T]he right of employers 'to terminate the employment at will for any cause, at any
time whatever, is not absolute, but limited by principles which protect persons from
gross or reckless disregard of their rights and interests, willful, wanton or malicious
acts, or acts done intentionally, with insult or in bad faith.'74
The court stated that malice would not make a wrong of that which is a lawful
act. 75 In other words, the court would not transform the lawful act of discharge
without cause into the unlawful act of wrongful discharge.
The court reaffirmed its strict adherence to the at-will doctrine in Phung v.
Waste Management, Inc.76 The plaintiff, Peter L. Phung, was employed as the
chief chemist for the defendant-employer, Waste Management, at the com-
66. 454 So. 2d 982 (Ala. 1984).
67. Id.
68. 46 Ohio St.2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976).
69. Id. at 246-47, 348 N.E.2d at 145-46.
70. Id. at 247, 348 N.E.2d at 146.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 248-49, 348 N.E.2d at 146-47.
74. Id. at 249, 348 N.E.2d at 147 (quoting Appellant's Brief).
75. Id. at 250, 348 N.E.2d at 148.
76. 23 Ohio St. 3d 100. 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
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pany's toxic disposal site for a two-year period, at the end of which the defend-
ant terminated the plaintiff's at-will relationship. 
7
The plaintiff alleged that during the course of his employment, he became
aware of defendant's substantial violations of its "legal and societal obliga-
tions."178 Upon ascertaining the nature, extent, and duration of the violations,
the plaintiff informed the defendant of the violations and demanded that they
cease. 7 The defendant then discharged the plaintiff from its employ.80 The de-
fendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's claim of wrongful discharge, maintaining
that such discharge of an at-will employee is not illegal under Ohio law.81 The
court stated the orthodox view of the at-will rule as controlling in Ohio: "Em-
ployment contracts can be terminated at will for any cause, at any time whatso-
ever, even if done in gross or reckless disregard of any employee's rights."8 2
Echoing Wood's rule of nineteenth-century contract law, the court affirmed that
"[a] fundamental policy in favor of the employment-at-will doctrine is the prin-
ciple that parties to a contractual relationship should have complete freedom to
fashion whatever relationship they so desire."8"
The court gave several reasons for not recognizing a public policy exception
to the at-will rule. Generally, Ohio had not previously recognized any public
policy exceptions. 84 Moreover, the court, following the dictates of the Ohio Con-
stitution, had deferred employment issues to the discretion of the legislature.8 5
The legislature, noted the court, had enacted a statute prohibiting an employer
from discharging an employee because the employee had filed a worker's com-
pensation claim. 88 The legislature had also prohibited the discharge without just
cause of any employee because of the race, color, sex, national origin, handicap,
age, or ancestry of any employee. 87 Specifically, the court asserted that the
plaintiff had failed to state a violation of "sufficiently clear public policy to
warrant creation of a cause of action."88 The court then held that "[p]ublic
policy does not require that there be an exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine when an employee is discharged for reporting to his employer that it is
conducting its business in violation of law."'88 It is unclear whether the court,
under its ruling, would not recognize a public policy exception unless expressly
enacted by the legislature or whether a plaintiff could state in his allegations a
"violation of a sufficiently clear public policy to warrant creation of a cause of
action."90
77. Id. at 100, 491 N.E.2d at 1115.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 101.491 N.E.2d at 1115.
82. Id. at 102, 491 N.E.2d at 1116 (quoting Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co., 5 Ohio App. 3d 203, 205 (1982)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 102, 491 N.E.2d at 1116.
85. Id. at 103, 491 N.E.2d at 1117.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88, Id. at 102, 491 N.E.2d at 1116-17.
89. Id. at 103, 491 N.E.2d at 1117.
90. Id. at 102, 491 N.E.2d at 1116-17.
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Judge Brown, in his vigorous dissenting opinion, castigated the majority's
refusal to recognize an exception to the at-will rule where there existed a clear
violation of public policy, calling such refusal "a travesty." 91 He noted that the
public policy exception had been adopted by a clear majority of states including
the five states bordering Ohio. 3 "[J]ustice requires that an employer conduct
business in a lawful manner."9 s The state had a legitimate interest in knowing
that regulations protecting citizens are being followed, and any reasonable effort
by an employee to serve such public interest should not be discouraged.94
Commentators have disagreed as to the implications of Phung concerning
the public policy exception. Some insist that the case did not recognize any
policy exception to the at-will rule95 while a contrary view is that Phung left the
door open for acceptance by the court of a more specific policy concern.9 6
B. Recent Cases Accepting or Implying Acceptance of Exceptions to the At-
Will Rule
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. 97 represented the Ohio courts' first recogni-
tion of an exception to its unqualified acceptance of the at-will rule. The plain-
tiff, Mers, held the position of traveling representative for the defendant, Dis-
patch Printing.98 After working for the defendant for four years, plaintiff was
arrested on charges of rape, kidnapping, and gross sexual misconduct.99 Al-
though he was suspended from his job because of the accusations, he was prom-
ised by defendant management that he would be reinstated when the criminal
charges were resolved in his favor.100 The initial trial resulted in a hung jury
and the charges were dismissed when the alleged victim decided not to prose-
cute the case further.101 The defendant then notified the plaintiff that he would
not be reinstated.10 2 The plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to relief based
either on the theory of breach of contract or on the theory of promissory estop-
pel. ' In defense, the employer denied any breach of an employment agree-
ment, and asserted that Mers was an employee at will, subject to termination
without cause. 0 4
Chief Justice Celebrezze, writing for the majority, stated that employment-
at-will, while subject to certain statutory limitations (citing the Ohio statutes
pertaining to race and age discrimination, worker's compensation, and others)
91. Id. at 108, 491 N.E.2d at 1120.
92. Id. at 104, 491 N.E.2d at 1117.
93. Id. at 105, 491 N.E.2d at 1118.
94. Id.
95. Comment, supra note 33, at 734.
96. Comment, supra note 61, at 480.
97. 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150.
98. Id. at 101, 483 N.E.2d at 152.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 101, 483 N.E.2d at 152.
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was still viable law. 05 The majority was not persuaded that the modern changes
that had occurred in employment relations constituted a sufficient reason for
abolishing the at-will rule.106 They indicated that this would result in the "un-
tenable" position of requiring Ohio courts to evaluate the business judgment of
employers. 1 7 "The need for certainty and continuity in the law requires us to
stand by precedent and not disturb a settled point unless extraordinary circum-
stances require it."' 08
The court went on to explain that they could discern two limits on the
general at-will rule based in contract law. The court would scrutinize the facts
and circumstances surrounding an at-will agreement to determine if there ex-
isted implied contractual provisions that may alter the terms of the discharge. 09
A second exception, held the court, occurs where representations or promises
have been made to the employee which involve promissory estoppel." 0 Promis-
sory estoppel applies when a promise that the employer should reasonably ex-
pect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the employee induced such
action or forbearance. "' The test was whether the employer should reasonably
expect its representations to be relied on and, if so, whether the expected action
or forbearance actually was detrimental to the employee. 12 The plaintiff alleged
that he relied, to his detriment, on his employer's representation that he would
be reinstated if the criminal charges were resolved favorably."13
Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion observed that he was "pleased to
see the majority . ..moving away from slavish adherence to the principles
enunciated in Fawcett . . . toward a recognition that there are and should be
exceptions to the antiquated and discredited employment-at-will doctrine."' 4
Recognizing a promissory estoppel exception to the at-will rule was, in his view,
a "first step.""15
The only member of the court to adhere strictly to the traditional at-will
rule was Justice Holmes. The precedential comfort the court minority and ma-
jority could take from limiting the exceptions to the at-will rule to promissory
estoppel was that they were still playing within the rules of contract law, the
original theoretical incubator for the at-will doctrine.
In response to the court's disinclination to move beyond the promissory es-
toppel exception, the legislature enacted Section 4113.52, a statute prohibiting
employers from discharging those employees who reported violations of federal
and state law." 8
Ohio Revised Code Section 4113.52 provides:
105. Id. at 103, 483 N.E.2d at 153.
106, Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 103, 483 N.E.2d at 154.
110. Id, at 104, 483 N.E.2d at 154.
III. Id. at 104-05. 483 N.E.2d at 154-55.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 106, 483 N.E.2d at 156.
115. Id. (emphasis in original).
116. OfIo REv. COD ANN. § 4113.52 (Baldwin 1989).
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(A)(1)(a) If an employee becomes aware in the course of his employment of a viola-
tion of any state or federal statute or any ordinance of regulation ... and the em-
ployee reasonably believes that the violation either is a criminal offense that is ... a
hazard to public health or safety or is a felony [the employee shall notify his supervi-
sor or if the employer fails to correct the violation, the employee may file notice with
public authority] . . .
(B) . . . no employer shall take any disciplinary or retaliatory action against an em-
ployee [for conforming with these provisions] . . .
(D) If an employer takes any disciplinary or retaliatory action against an employee as
a result of the employee's having filed a report under [this provision] . . . the em-
ployee may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or for remedies.. .. 117
The statute restricts the award to attorney's fees, litigation costs, incidentals,
and back pay with interest.
Soon after the enactment of the above statute, the court decided Helmick
v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc."" In that case, female employees alleged
tortious interference with and breach of the employment contracts by the de-
fendant.1 ' The plaintiffs also alleged that throughout the course of their em-
ployment with defendant company, they were subjected to sexual abuse of a
criminal nature by the company's sales manager.' When the plaintiff Helmick
became dissatisfied with her work environment and began a search for another
position, the defendant vice president discouraged Helmick from pursuing these
new employment opportunities by informing her that a raise had been approved
and that she would have a career with the company as long as her performance
was good.' Helmick then halted her job search."'
The court held that a "demonstration of detrimental reliance on specific
promises of job security can create an exception to the employment-at-will doc-
trine."' 23 At first impression, the holding of this case appeared to be nothing
more than an affirmation of promissory estoppel doctrine. The court gave no
indication that it would use the employer's alleged violation of criminal law
pertaining to sexual abuse to find liability based on public policy exceptions. In
his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas complained:
[As the majority] applies Mers to a new situation, it drags along the outdated absolu-
tist position exemplified in Fawcett and Phung. I eagerly await the time when this
court tosses away the view that a party has the right to violate with malice . . . the
rights of others. Since this court does not tolerate this type behavior in any other area
of law, we should not condone gross disregard of rights of employees in the employ-
ment area.""
Justice Wright in his majority opinion noted the effect that Section
4113.52 will have in changing the at-will doctrine in Ohio. "[T]he legislature
quite properly reviewed the holding in Phung and asserted its power to make
public policy by passing . . . [R.C. 4113.52], which [has] the effect of modify-
117. Id.
118. 45 Ohio St.3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212 (1989).
119. Id. at 132, 543 N.E.2d at 1213.
120. Id. at 132, 543 N.E.2d at 1214.
121. Id. at 136, 543 N.E.2d at 1217.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 137, 543 N.E.2d at 1218.
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ing the common law."125 Since two members of the court had openly stated
their desire to adopt a public policy exception, and three of the justices con-
cured in Justice Wright's majority opinion containing recognition of Section
4113.52, acceptance by the court of a public policy exception appeared
imminent.
Outright recognition of the public policy exception came with Greeley v.
Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.12 6 When an Ohio court ordered
the employer-defendant to withhold a specified amount from the employees's
wages to ensure payment of child support obligations, the employer refused to
comply. 127 Soon after, the employer discharged the employee.228 The statute the
employer violated stated: "[N]o employer may use an order to withhold per-
sonal earnings . . . as a basis for discharge of. . .a person. The court may fine
an employer who so discharges . . . an employee . . . not more than five hun-
dred dollars.' 29
The court observed that to limit punishment for violation of the statute by
an employer to a mere $500 fine would mean that the offending corporation
could ignore the legislature's policy behind the statute."10 Such a fine would not
deter a corporation from illegally discharging an employee in these circum-
stances.131 "The courts must be empowered not only to punish, but to remedy
such public policy violations."' 132 To be forced to prohibit a civil remedy for
violation of a statute because the statute restricts itself to an insignificant fine
would be to agree, said the court, "with Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist when he
said: '[I]f the law supposes that . . . the law is a ass .... ,,13
The court now proclaimed the recognition of the public policy exception to
the at-will doctrine, noting that they were joining thirty-nine states which had
already accepted it."' The public policy exception would extend in tort12 5 to an
employee "discharged or disciplined for a reason which is prohibited by stat-
ute."136 The employment-at-will rule was no longer seen as sacrosanct. "[T]he
right of employers to terminate employment at will for 'any cause' no longer
includes the discharge of an employee where the discharge is in violation of a
statute and thereby contravenes public policy. 117 The orthodox adherence of
the Fawcett court to the inviolability of the at-will rule was decisively rejected.
However, the court had only decided the issue of the public policy excep-
tion within the confines of a specific statutory authorization. The statute had
prescribed that an employer could not use an order to withhold an employee's
125. Id. at 136 n.7, 543 N.E.2d at 1217 n.7.
126. 49 Ohio St. 3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990).
127. Id. at 229, 551 N.E.2d at 982.
128. Id.
129. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.213(D) (Baldwin 1989).
130. 49 Ohio St. 3d at 232, 551 N.E.2d at 985.
131. Id. at 232, 551 N.E.2d at 984.
132. Id. at 232, 551 N.E.2d at 985.
133. Id. at 233. 551 N.E.2d at 985.
134. Id. at 234 & n.3. 551 N.E.2d at 986 & n.3.
135. Id. at 235, 551 N.E.2d at 987.
136. Id. at 234, 551 N.E.2d at 986.
137. Id. at 234, 551 N.E.2d at 987.
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wages to discharge or discipline the employee. The question remained whether
the court would embrace public policy exceptions which were not specifically
mandated by statute. In a carefully worded dictum, the court stated: "This is
not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine
but . . . such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as
the violation of a statute."'3 8 This surely operates to expand the public policy
exception to those statutes that do not specifically prohibit the discharge of the
employee where the employer is in violation of the statute. For instance, if there
existed a statute requiring an Ohio resident of voting age to report for jury duty
when required, would it be proper for an employer to discharge an employee
who complied with the law? Under the employment-at-will doctrine, the em-
ployer would be immune from the penalties of the law even though he had
deliberately thwarted it by discharging the law-abiding employee. This is an
egregious result. "The question thus arises, must a person called to execute the
mandated duties of a citizen choose between the possible termination of employ-
ment on the one hand, or be punished for failure to execute that mandated civil
obligation on the other hand? The question would seem to answer itself."" 39
V. CONCLUSION: ECONOMIC AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AND
AGAINST THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The opponents of the public policy exception argue that the breakdown of
the at-will rule will adversely impact business."'4 The principal loss will be one
of efficiency. The ability to discharge at will discourages employee abuse of the
system by encouraging employees to exercise self-restraint. A quick termination
of the employee unobstructed by cost-escalating litigation provides a clean
break with minimal disruption of company operations.14' Operational costs of
overseeing an at-will shop are relatively inexpensive due to the absence of litiga-
tion.14' Finally, the employee benefits as well. Since capricious employers will
not be able to obtain the best employees or retain such employees due to a bad
reputation among the workforce (because employees may resign from unpalat-
able jobs as they wish), the employers will damage themselves in the work-
place.' 43 Employees will benefit from working for employers who structure their
operations to take into account the interests of their workers.
Opponents of the at-will rule maintain that the efficiency "benefit" is a
shibboleth because the at-will rule fails to account for the transaction costs and
information barriers inherent in such a system.' 44 For the individual employee,
the termination of employment incurs the expense of searching for new employ-
ment, the expense of moving, and indeterminate costs of emotional distress and
loss of status. For the employer, high turnover means waste of training and re-
138. Id. at 235, 551 N.E.2d at 987.
139. Id. at 232, 551 N.E.2d at 985.
140. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984).
141. Id. at 965.
142. Id. at 970.
143. Id. at 968.
144. Note, supra note 19, at 1830.
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training, disruption of continuity and lost expertise. The at-will doctrine fosters
employee insecurity and disloyalty. However, increased job security and em-
ployment participation reduces absenteeism and the turnover rate, thus possibly
leading to increased productivity.145
Even the proponents of employment-at-will have acknowledged that public
policy exceptions may be necessary when the at-will rule is at odds with the
public interest. "Just as a contract to commit murder should not be enforceable,
neither should one to pollute illegally or to commit perjury."146 In a democratic
society, unlike those governed by totalitarian regimes, the citizenry is expected
to fully participate in the enactment of and adherence to the law. Statutes en-
acted by the legislature inform the citizenry and place them on notice as to
which policies have been transformed into law. It is the codification of public
policy. All who comprise the citizenry of a democratic society may violate the
statutory law and the public policy from which they spring only if they are
willing to suffer the penalties that attach to such laws.
It would be ironic if the one area of this society where citizens were either
discouraged from adhering to the law or encouraged to disregard the law would
be the workplace. Maintaining a separate and elite role above the law for em-
ployers alone hardly comports with judicial notions of equality and fairness. The
day of the feudal lord and serf has justifiably been discarded in all other phases
of democratic society. An unencumbered public policy exception to the at-will
rule founded on statute would obviate such anti-egalitarian influences, requiring
the employer to conform to the law in the same manner as the rest of the
populace.
Eugene N. Lindenbaum
145. Id. at 1834-35.
146. Epstein, supra note 140, at 952.
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